Abstract. Ad-hoc network without centralized infrastructure makes its security problem tricky. In this paper, we proposed a full distributed secret key management scheme to handle it. The main contribution of this paper is that we combined combined-RSA threshold scheme with elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) to construct a full distributed secret key management scheme. There are several advantages in our scheme comparing with traditional distributed secret key management key: First we transfer the secret share generation process from initiator to nodes which belong to this network so that ECC generation process and secret share generation process can be performed in parallel. Second, the establishment of secure communication between nodes is straightforward and efficient. Third the secret share generation process for new node non-interactive, furthermore secret share update process is also non-interactive. At last we also analyzed the strength of security of the scheme to show it can fulfill the security requirements of ad-hoc.
Introduction
Ad-hoc network is defined as a set of autonomous devices connecting each other through the wireless link without centralized infrastructure. That is to say some of nodes in network play the role of routers to transmit packets to destination [1] . Considering some of the characteristics such as open environment, shared wireless medium, lack of infrastructure and etc. [2] , providing security service is harder for ad-hoc than network with infrastructure. At this stage, the public key cryptography is an ideal solution to solve the ad-hoc security problem. The main content of public cryptography for ad-hoc is a secure key management. Evaluating the quality of a key management scheme depends on whether it can provide some of the functions required in a particular environment, such as the distribution of keys, the reconstruction of keys, and the verification of secret share. Prior to this, many scholars have proposed the key management schemes. There are three general approaches in literature contribution for solving the key management problem. 1. Key management based on ID. 2. Key management based on inter-certificate. 3 . Key management based on public key cryptography. But majority of scheme can't fulfill the whole requirement of the ad-hoc network.
Ad-hoc network exists many vulnerabilities towards key management scheme, such as middle attack [3] , eavesdrop problem [3] and so on. In order to solve the problem of man-in-the-middle attacks, Hölbl et al. comes up with [4] . In this paper, He used identity-based authenticated scheme to handle it, But Nose proved Hölbl's scheme could not hold man-in-the-middle attacks in [5] . As for eavesdrop problem, Harn et al. present a Threshold scheme in [6] which mentioned the secret share should be transmitted secretly, but he didn't show how to transmit. In addition to security problem, there is another problem in ad-hoc. Most of key management scheme need an initiator to generate the essential system parameters. If there are lots of parameters that need to be generated, it takes a pretty long time to initialize the system. Gharib put forward [7] and its initialization phase needs to generate parameter for each node in the network. If there are n nodes in the network, initiator needs to generate 2n parameter in total. Besides, initiator needs to transmit these parameters secretly. This process will take some time. Therefore, we propose a key management scheme to solve the weakness mentioned above.
The main contribution of our paper is that we come up with a novel fully distributed secret key management scheme based on ECC. The detail contributions of our paper are as follow: 1) Exploit the node to generate secret share rather than initiator. 2) Construct a security communication method between nodes. 3) Simplify the join/leave process of node using combined RSA scheme. 4) Analyze the security of our scheme.
The rest of the paper would be organized as following. Preliminaries will be introduced in section 2. We present our scheme in section 3. Section 4 shows the security analysis of our scheme. We conclude our work in section 5
Preliminaries
In this section, we show the basic background used in our scheme, including ECC [10] , RSA, Combined RSA [11] Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
RSA
RSA is a public key encryption algorithm proposed by Rivest et al. In their scheme, they choose two large prime number p, q, then compute n=p·q. Let ø(n)=lcm(p-1,q-1) Select a integer e from (1,ø(n)) as its public key. Calculate d as its private key according to Eq. (2) using Extended Euclidean algorithm. Given e and n, d couldn't be calculated in polynomial-time.
Combined RSA Threshold Scheme This scheme was proposed by Zhang et al. Given several RSA instances, we can use RSA insta-nces to construct a (t, n) threshold [12] . Let λ i =lcm(p i -1,q i -1 
Proposed Scheme
Assumption
We assume there are n nodes in adhoc network and there is no trusty relationship between nodes before communication. There is also a signature collector in the network whose responsibility is to gather secret share from nodes and sign the message but won't store the master secret key in its memory. Besides, it has a list which stores the nodes that are new to the network. All nodes are in an open environment and nodes can join/leave network freely. The number of neighbors in the node is greater than t. All nodes have the ability to generate two large prime numbers and store theirs product. There is a system initiator in the network whose responsibility is to generate necessary system parameters. After generating the necessary system parameters, it leaves the network. We also assume there are always adversary nodes in the network. The adversary node can intercept any information in the network. In a certain period, we allow there are t-1 compromised nodes in our network under t>n/2 condition [13] . Table 1 presents some necessary annotations. 
Initialization Phase
In this part, we will introduce the initialization phase which contains four sub-phases. The details of phases are introduced as follow.
Initiator. Initiator generates a large prime number p and construct a elliptic curve E(F p ) which satisfies 4a 3 +27b 2 ≠0(mod p) where a, b ∈ F p over F p using Eq.(1). Choose a base point B with order q where q is also a prime number and q|#(E(F p )), then Initiator generate private key x. Calculate the public key y, where y = x· B. Furthermore, initiator needs to generate a hash function h of collision free, such as SHA-3 [15] .At last it chooses an integer e and then it publishes y, e, B, q, h.
Node Initialization. While the initiator generates system parameters, the node also generates its secret share. Each node chooses p i , q i from (M, 2M) such that gcd(e, λ i )=1, where M is a large prime number and λ i =lcm-(p i -1,q i -1). Calculate n i using Eq. 
Threshold Construct. After nodes in the network finishing generating secret shares, Initiator encrypts master secret key x using Eq. (3). Hence, we can construct a (t, n) threshold scheme. One can decrypt c i.e. master secret key x using Eq. (4) if and only if he gets t or more different secret shares. Node Communication. If node i decides to communicates with node j, It sends his public number n i to node j. So node j knows which node needs to communicate with it, then node j finds the public communication key of node i and calculate communication key using Eq. (8) . Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) present how to send message security. Figure. 1 presents the detail and encryption and decryption. 
Message Signature Phase
For some special message, network needs to sign it to provide a method that anyone can verify the correctness of this message. According to what we discussed above, signature collector has to gather t or more different secret shares to sign a message. Hence, signature process will have the following steps: 1) Signature collector collects t different shares (λ i , n i ) which are not in the newly added nodes list.
2) First, It computes d ø using Extended Euclidean algorithm, then computes master secret key d using Eq.(4).
3) It chooses an integer k, where 0<k<q and compute R using Eq. (11). 4) Let r =x R , where x R denotes the coordinates of the R's x-axis. 5) Given a message m, calculate s using Eq. (12) . So the signature is (r, s). Through the above steps we completed the signature of the message. Message signature verification also has the following steps: 1) Calculate auxiliary value w using Eq. (13).
2) Calculate auxiliary value u 1 using Eq. (14).
3) Calculate auxiliary value u 2 using Eq. (15). 4) Compute P using Eq. (16). 5) Check the equation that if x p ≡ r (mod q). If x p and r is equal, then signature is valid, otherwise it is invalid [15] . After finishing message signature phase, signature collector drops the master secret key d and recalculates the c using Eq. (3), where [N] includes the former node and newly added node. Then Reset the newly added nodes list.
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Node Join/Leave Phase
If A new node requests to join the network, then it needs to get p, e, B, q, n i . These parameters are stored in each node in the network. Therefore, node join phase has the following steps: 1) New node needs to generate its own secret share by generating three numbers p new , q new , a new satisfying gcd(e, λ i )=1, where p new and q new are large prime numbers and λ i =lcm(p new -1,q new -1). Besides, a new is an integer.
2) New node calculates n new = p new ·q new , x new , y new using Eq. (6) and Eq. (7), then publishes n new , y new .
3) At the same, signature collector adds n new to its newly added nodes list. This is the whole process of joining nodes to the network. For node that leaves the network, it just needs to broadcast leaving request and n leave , then any node receives the n leave , it drops the n leave from its node list.
Secret Share Update Phase
In our scheme, secret share update process is easy to implement.In a period of time, secret share is constant. After a period of time, secret share needs to be updated.So the update node needs to regenerate two large prime as node initialization phase discussed above. When the update process finished, it republishes its n r , y r .
Security Analysis
In this section, we will analyze the security of our proposed scheme. The security of key mamagement scheme can be evaluated by security of services that the scheme provides. Our scheme provides majority of services including key confidentiality, backward and forward secrecy, resistance against compromising, full distributed key, node authentication.
Key confidentiality [16] means that in an open environment adversary can not learn any key information. In our scheme, the generation of new node's secret share is non-interactive which means There is no secret key information leak during transmission. Besides, our scheme is built on ECC based on discrete logarithm problem and RSA based on a large number of decomposition. Both questions are hard problems i.e. there is no algorithm that can find the private key in polynomial time.
As for backward and forward secrecy [16] , they both focus on preventing adversary from deriving new key from old keys. In our scheme, nodes' communication key is independent. Besides, new node constructs his communication key independently. Even if adversary knows one key or subset keys, adversary can't get the other key. So our scheme provides backward and forward secrecy.
Resistance against compromising the nodes [16] is the capability of the scheme to defend against or tolerate attacks. Our scheme distributes the key among all nodes which can solve single point of failure problem. Our scheme is full security unless adversary compromises t or more nodes. Because in (t, n)-threshold, If anyone wants to get the private key or secret, he has to collect t or more different shares. Therefore, our scheme is resistance against compromising nodes under the premise of t≥n/2 +1.
If there is a trusted center, then adversary is able to corrupt it.So if trusted center is compromised, then the whole network is compromised. There is no trusted center in network in our scheme, because our scheme is fully distributed. This scheme avoids the problem we discussed above.
Another important service is security communication between nodes. In our scheme, each node publishes its public communication key and public number n. If one node receives public number n. it checks whether it is legal. If it is legal, it authenticates the sender, otherwise ignores it. Our scheme also prevents adversary from forging the communication key. Therefore, our scheme can deal with key authentication.
Summary
In this paper, we proposed a fully distributed secret key management scheme using ECC and combined RSA threshold. Our scheme is designed to be used in ad-hoc network. We introduce the basic background of our scheme then show our scheme in detail. At last we analyze the security of our scheme. There are three main contributions in our scheme: 1) Utilize the node to generate the secret share rather than initiator. 2) Build a security communication method between nodes. 3) Simplify the join/leave process of node using combined RSA scheme. Next we will focus on applying this scheme to computing equipment with limited resources.
